moralists claim that the Constitution itself, in phrases such as "due process of law" or "equal protection of the laws," invites judges to do moral theory and then impose that theory's strictures as constitutional law, supreme over all other law. Others view the point of the Constitution to be the legal implementation and protection of our pre-existing moral rights. In their view, any attempted derogation from those rights would be a constitutional nullity regardless of the Constitution's specific text. 1 Constitutional moralists come in all political shades. Some are on the left of the political spectrum. A generation ago, David A. J. Richards "found" in the Constitution a Rawlsian theory of justice.
2 Somewhat earlier, in his famous Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, Frank
Michelman argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could serve as the basis for a judiciallyordered and Rawlsian-justified redistribution of wealth. 3 And much more recently, Larry Sager has postulated that the Constitution is "incorrigible" and is "justice-seeking," even if not all of the justice it seeks should be implemented by judges. 4 Because Sager does not think constitutional interpreters are bound by the Constitution's original meaning, 5 it is not clear to me
on his view what prevents the Constitution from achieving justice rather than merely seeking it.
Ronald Dworkin merits special attention as a constitutional moralist of the left.
Sometimes Dworkin supports constitutional leftism through his general interpretive theory of law, including constitutional law. For Dworkin, the "law" of a community is determined by asking what are the most morally acceptable principles that "fit" a sizeable fraction of legal One such moralist of the Right is Hadley Arkes. Arkes argues that, in interpreting the Constitution, one must go beyond its text to first principles, principles that are antecedent to it.
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And although he would strenuously resist being labeled as on the Right, because his moral views are quite libertarian, 12 and because he believes all law, including constitutional law, must be interpreted to accord with "moral reality," I shall put my good friend, Michael Moore, perhaps much to his chagrin, into the camp of constitutional moralists who are at least somewhat on the Right. 13 
II. The Political Theorists
My next category of constitutional theorists are those who "interpret" the Constitution as the implementation of a political theory. Now I realize that hiving off the political theorists from the moralists is somewhat arbitrary, given that the former generally put forward their political theory in service of a moral theory. (Indeed, David Richard, whom I have labeled a moralist, refers to his views as political theory.) Still, as a matter of emphasis at least, the political rather than the moral theory is dominant in the political theorists' approach to the Constitution. 11 See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990 The most influential proponent of such a view is Philip Bobbitt. 24 Bobbitt claims that there are six modalities of constitutional argument-historical, textual, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and ethical-and that although these overlap, they are distinct. None can be reduced to another. Moreover, they are not related hierarchically, with some modalities lexically superior to others.
I have argued elsewhere that the modalities view of constitutional law is a nest of confusions. 25 As I put it, the fact that lawyers argue for a specific outcome by invoking whichever modality favors their position does not mean the Constitution is nothing but the argumentative practice of invoking these modalities. When lawyers invoke history, text, structure, prudence, doctrine, or ethics, they are claiming the factor they are invoking, not their practice of invoking it, is the law.
Second, the Constitution cannot be all of these modalities simultaneously. Indeed, unless the modalities were lexically ordered, so that, for example, original meaning trumped precedent (doctrine) or vice versa, the Constitution could only be one of them. That is because they cannot be coherently "combined." Trying to "combine" original meaning with precedent and with justice would be, as I put it, like combining pi, green and the Civil War. Given their nonlexical relationship with each other and their inability to be combined, when two lawyers invoke different modalities in a constitutional case, they are either arguing past each other rather than with each other, or else they are asking the court to choose their favored modality, at least for this case. I say "at least for this case" because the modalities are supposed to persist even if they failed to prevail in various cases.
In truth, each modality represents a different Constitution. In the historical modality, the Constitution is that set norms intended by the historical Constitution's authors. In the doctrinal modality, the Constitution is that set of norms established by Supreme Court precedents. In the ethical modality, the Constitution is the set of norms the "interpreter" believes are morally best.
Because these modalities cannot be meaningfully combined, and because it strains credulity that when advocates employ a modality, they are asking the court to choose a Constitution for this case only, the modalities view of constitutional theory collapses.
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The other practice theory of note is that of Mitch Berman. responding to some metaphysical truth but to a sense of which arguments are weightier or more reasonable. 30 And that sense will be born of participating in the practice of legal argumentation.
Without an ontological account of the Constitution and its norms, one that is external to the practice of legal argumentation, how can we tell if a constitutional argument is weighty or reasonable? In another piece, Berman argues that we do so by a method of reflective equilibrium in which we consult our "constitutional intuitions" as well as the Constitution's text, precedent, and so forth.
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Berman gives, as an example of how his methodology might work, the controversy over would surely not deem the former to be the clause's meaning, nor would the latter withstand strong evidence to the contrary.
Here is how I put my objection to Berman's reflective equilibrium approach in earlier pieces:
With respect to reflective equilibrium, which I agree is an appropriate methodology for determining one's moral views, that method is completely inappropriate when it comes to the content of specific posited stuff and to other specific facts. Did or did not the framers put the specific language regarding "natural born Citizen" in Article II?
That question-to which the answer is "yes"-is not resolved by reflective equilibrium any more than is the question how high in feet is Let me conclude this section with a final verdict on the "constitutional law as an argumentative practice" view, of which Bobbitt and Berman are principal proponents. I find the view to be deeply incoherent. Either our arguments about the Constitution have an external object, or they do not. If the latter, and they are self-referential, then they are self-undermining.
For we cannot sensibly argue about whether we are arguing.
The view that the Constitution is an argumentative practice represents a category mistake.
It substitutes an external point of view that an observer of constitutional arguments might hold- 
Mark Tushnet falls into this category. In 1999 he published Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts, 39 the principal theses of which are a rejection of judicial supremacy and the advocacy of the "thin" Constitution rather than the "thick" one. The latter is the actual Constitution in all its detail. The former consists of basic principles, such as equality, freedom of expression, and liberty. 40 Tushnet argues that judicial supremacy is neither necessary nor desirable on behalf of the thin Constitution. Legislative action-that Tushnet calls "populist constitutional law"-is where the thin Constitution is best secured. And because legislative action cannot be entrenched against reversal by subsequent legislative action, the Constitution on Tushnet's view will turn out to be "fundamental law" and supreme over ordinary law only, if at all, in the minds of the citizenry and their legislative representatives.
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Another anti-constitutionalist is Michael Seidman, Tushnet's long-time colleague and occasional co-author. Seidman's book, Our Unsettled Constitution, 42 makes a case against settling fundamental maters in a Constitution. Seidman's point is that any such settlement will appear erroneous to some people at some point, and they will contest its legitimacy, especially if democratic contestation of that settlement is foreclosed by strong-form judicial review of the 41 Interestingly, many believe that judicial review is most necessary for matters arising under the "thick" Constitution, especially those matters that determine the rules under which ordinary politics is conducted, such as how Congress and the President are chosen, how a bill becomes law, who can make a treaty or appoint executive officers, and so on. Major disputes over these matters, although they might be handled satisfactorily without the intervention of the courts as neutral arbiters, might not be, with the consequence that politics might devolve into anarchy.
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION (2001).
A recent prominent entrant in the lists of anti-constitutionalists is Larry Kramer. Kramer calls his position "popular constitutionalism" because he, like Tushnet and Seidman, opposes judicial supremacy and supports vesting "the people" with ultimate authority over constitutional interpretation. 43 Kramer is vague about the interpretive methodology "the people" should employ. 44 He is clear, however, that constitutional law is not ordinary law of a higher rank, something the Constitution itself seems to imply. 45 As he puts it, Constitutional or fundamental law subsisted as an independent modality, distinct from both politics and from the ordinary law interpreted and enforced by courts. It was a special category of law. It possessed critical attributes of ordinary law: its obligations were meant to be binding, for example, and its content was not a matter of mere will or policy but reflected rules whose meaning was determined by argument based on precedent, analogy, and principle. Yet constitutional law also purported to govern the sovereign itself, thus generating controversies that were inherently matters for resolution in a political domain. Modern discourse has so thoroughly conflated the meaning of "constitution" with "law" and of "law" with "courts" that we no longer possess the language to describe a distinct category of 43 My final anti-constitutionalist is Jeremy Waldron. Like the others, Waldron is a fierce opponent of strong judicial review; but unlike Kramer, who reposes constitutional interpretation vaguely in "the people," Waldron argues specifically for legislative supremacy in constitutional law. 47 The underlying value motivating Waldron is that of equality, which for him extends to equality of say over the meaning of constitutional principles.
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What unites the anti-constitutionalists is their hostility to strong judicial review and to viewing the 1789 Constitution and its amendments as ordinary law, fit for ordinary legal analysis and craft. Judges are adept at the latter. If, however, the Constitution is not merely ordinary law of the highest rank, but not ordinary law at all, then its meaning is not necessarily within the special ken of lawyers and judges. As best I can tell, the anti-constitutionalists regard "the Constitution" as the name we give to the locus of political clashes over our most fundamental ideals rather than a legal document produced by specific people at a specific time.
VI. The Originalists
My final category of constitutional theorists is that of the originalists. Originalists regard the Constitution as an historical artifact, a legal document posited by certain people following certain procedures at specific times. For originalists, the Constitution is just a super statute 46 KRAMER, supra note 43, at 24 (footnotes omitted). 47 See Jeremy Waldron, "The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review," 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006) . 48 See Jeremy Waldron, "Precommitment and Disagreement," in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 271 (L. Alexander ed., 1998).
enacted in a particular way. Apart from its supremacy over other law, the Constitution is just ordinary law and should be interpreted as if it were ordinary law.
Originalists divide into two camps with respect to how that interpretation should proceed.
They agree that the meaning of a constitutional provision is fixed at the time the provision is enacted and is unchanging thereafter. They disagree, however, about what that meaning is. A few, including me, believe that the meaning of a constitutional provision is its authorially- Now there are two real problems that the OIM view must grapple with. One problem is that even the authors themselves may not know whether they intended their norm to cover certain specific applications. The authors of "No vehicles in the park" may be able to answer "yes" or "no" to questions such as "Did you intend to cover bicycles?" and "Did you intend to cover ambulances?" but be unable to answer "Did you intend to cover skateboards?" When the authors do not know what meaning they intended, then there is no intended meaning for the audience to discover.
The second problem for the proponents of OIM, one that is oft noted, is that of collective authorship. Whenever the authorities whose intended meanings matter are a group, the question naturally arises whether a group can have an intended meaning. Must all members of the group share the meaning, or at least all members necessary for the norm's enactment?
It was largely in response to this second problem of OIM that most originalists adopted OPM. For OPM rests not on the meaning intended by a group but on the meaning that a single individual-some representative or idealized member of the public at the time of the enactment of the provision in question-would understand to be the meaning of that provision.
Unfortunately for originalists, if OIM is the frying pan of group intent problems, OPM is a fire of much more formidable ones.
First, there is no non-arbitrary way to ascertain or construct the member of the public whose understanding of a constitutional provision is to be determinative. I have written at length about this problem elsewhere and so shall be brief here. 
VII. The Rule of Recognition and The Hardest Questions of Constitutional Theory
It is time, finally, for me to look down upon these conflicting constitutional theories from more Olympian heights. And the first thing to note is that almost every one of these theories could be correct as a theory of our constitutional law. Back now to the rule of recognition. For Hart, the rule of recognition was whatever criteria officials accepted as determinative of legal validity. 54 One would think, however, that citizens as well as officials would have to accept those criteria, lest the officials would be nothing more than "gunmen writ large" vis-à-vis the citizens. 
